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THE ACQUXSXTXOH OP TECBHOLOGY AND SMALL PXRMS BY LARGE PXRMS*
by Ove Granstrand Sören Sjölander
Xntroduction
The output and resource use of the world I s science and technology (S&T) system has grown fast and steadily with no signs of decline. Seven-to ten-year doubling times in the stock of knowledge, as indicated for example by bibliometric data or R&D expenditures, are common, corresponding to growth rates of about 7 to 10%.
By contrast , industrialized production tends to grow more slowly, as does the number of innovations, with average annual growth rates of roughly 3% and 5% respectively for Sweden between 1945 and 1980 . This suggests the possibility of an expanding set of unexploited technological opportunities , especially in the light of resul ts indicating that technology accounts for a very large part of output growth. 1 )
Given the growth differential, for technology? Could there is there a deficient demand be overcapacity in the S&T system that is protected on non-economic grounds? Or is there an undercapacity in the technology management system in the form of manageriaI bottle-necks regarding the exploitation of technology (Penrose 1959) ? It is weIl known that the nature of R&D leads to underinvestment (Arrow 1962) . On the other hand, a number of factors, such as a tendency to look at R&D as a kind of insurance premium or a lottery ticket, could cause overinvestment. The complexity of modern technology, requiring interaction of many highly specialized scientists and engineers, poses special problems for both markets and management to organize efficient innovation and diffusion processes. The matching of specific financial assets with human assets of various kinds is critical. The problem is exacerbated by the pace of knowledge accumulation noted above. For example, with a 40-year working lifetime for an average individual and a 10-year doubling time of knowledge in a given field, roughly 94% of the existing stock of S&T knowledge will be produced by scientists and engineers still alive and active. Moreover, a very small and declining share of that growing stock of knowledge could be acquired and mastered by a single indi vidual during his or her working lifetime and then with a considerable lag. Thus, the current stock of technological knowledge is embodied in and fragmented among human assets to a very high degree and the matching of the different pieces of knowledge is also critical, given the increasing complexity of industrial production.
The emergence of corporations that exploit several technologies is one response to these problems. Externalization of technology sourcing and the creation of "technology markets" is another (Granstrand and Sjölander 1989) . Even with these developments there is a need to develop new methods of technology management and new market mechanisms for translating technological developments into wide ly deployed innovative products and processes. All in all, one can speculate that a rise of quasi-integrated (or hybrid) organizational and market forms is most efficiency-inducing in innovation (Granstrand 1982, pp. 196-200) .
Given this, the present contribution intends to show how 2mall ~echnology-Qased tirms (STBFs) are acquired by large ~echnology-Qased tirms (LTBFs), typically multi-technology corporations. Such acquisitions constitute a fairly recent phenomenon and the paper gives results based on case studies and a pilot survey. These results indicate that structural changes in the form of such acquisitions generate growth under certain condi tions. A new mechanism or system is therefore proposed whereby STBFs are traded in the sense of being created, possibly as a spin-off from another firm, and then being acquired by LTBFs immediately or later. This would correspond to a very special market for corporate control,typically not involving hostility and management displacement. (ef. Marris 1963.) This form of trading technology, "packaged" in small firms, is to be compared with other forms of trading technology, e.g. trading licenses or R&D resources. At present there are no empirical data available about the functioning and comparative advantages of such a complete acquisition and spin-off system. However, some theoretical rationales are indicated here, and further research may develop a full theoretical justification.
Acquisition and Exploitation of Technoloqy
The technoloqy-base of a company is the technological competence or capability (knowledge and skills) that the company possesses. It would ideally appear as an asset on the balance sheet of the company, although this is not easy to accomplish. Nevertheless, the asset is in effect valued in practice, for instance when a company is a target for acquisition. The asset can be built up, maintained and exploited in various ways. Granstrand (1982, p. 66) These different strategies for acquiring and exploiting new technologies may be combined. For example, both Swedish and Japanese f irms have absorbed foreign technology and then combined it with internal development and subsequently -exploited it through direct investments in production and international marketing. Strategies may also evolve, as in Japan's and recently South Korea's shifts of relative emphasis from technology-scanning to licensing and subsequently to interna l R&D. Now consider an LTBF's strategy to acquire innovative firms (STBFs), add value to them through capital and/ or management and/or technology contributions, and then af ter a suitable period of time integrate them or divest them in various ways. This is how many venture capital firms and venture development units attached to aparent firm operate. 2 ) A given firm may acquire another firm or a product development project at a certain stage in its product and business development process. The interna l growth is usually increased if this acquisition occurs at a late stage, but then the price will be high. Experience has shown that a higher probability of failure is associated with acquisitions made before the acquired firm or project has its new product on the market, rather than afterward. It is also difficult to disengage from an unsuccessful STBF with lingering profit prospects.
In what follows we focus on the acquisition by large technology-based firms of small technology-based firms in general, not necessarily for the sole purpose of divesting them at a later stage, and we will try to assess the effects of that strategy, especially on growth. First we briefly consider a Japanese sample, then a Swedish one in mor e depth.
3.
Acquisition of Small Technology-Based Firms by Japanese Large Firms
As part of an ongoing study of multi-technology corporations in Japan, Sweden and the US, 14 large Japanese manu·facturing corporations were interviewed in April-May 1988. In general these corporations were diversifying both their technology-base and product base. 10 of them were strengthening their R&D in absolute terms and in 5 of these ca ses also relative to sales. 10 of them considered technological diversification and technology fusion of increasing importance. Within five years 8 of them had significantly increased, or will increase, their investments in basic research, and 6 of them were seriously considering , or already in the process of, internationalizing their R&D.
Japanese large firms acquire STBFs much less frequently than do Swedish and US firms, and this technology acquisition strategy ranks low in comparison with other possible means of acquiring technology (in-house R&D, joint ventures, licensing in, etc., as described above). Only 3 out of the 14 f irms had acquired technology through takeovers, and the n to a minor extent, of ten in an ad hoc manner • Also, technology-based spin-offs from universities and large firms are very rare in Japan.
These facts could be attributed mainly to a traditional mentality among owners and managers. Also, there are few small technology-based firms to acquire. The rate of technology-based start-ups has been low, and existing firms seldom sell a subsidiary to another firm. 3 ) Lifetime employment and strong company loyalty imply low inter-firm mobility of engineers and managers. A social stigma seems also to be associated with the personnel of an acquired firm.
Things are changing, however. The number of acquisitions, start-ups and spin-off s is increasing. A Japanese venture capital market is developing. Investment by large Japanese firms in small, high-tech US firms linked up with universities and other basic research institutions is increasing. This creates concern and confusion in the US, since buying high-tech firms, perhaps also with university links, could be an efficient way of getting access to a nation' s S&T system. The same possibilities do not exist in Japan for US firms, since Japanese universities and small firms are comparatively less important in the Japanese basic S&T system. However, these investments, according to one highranking Japanese company and government representative interviewed, should be looked upon not primarily as away to get research results in the short run, but as a way for Japanese industry to learn more about the American S&T system and this mode of technology acquisition at the cost of "losing" much talented personnel to the US at present.
Of course, overly wealthy Japanese firms and a high-valued yen could be perceived by the US as constituting a new kind of "threat" to the appropriation of the American S&T base by US industry, which in tur n relies much more on its domestic universities and small, high-tech firms for building up its technological capability • (Note how Japanese companies earlier bought inexpensive licences from the US, by some called "the biggest bargain ever" . The further development and exploitation of this technology later gave rise to severe trade friction between the US and Japan. CUrrently investment friction arises when Japan invests part of her trade surpluses in US assets, including S&T assets.) A similar perception of asymmetry could develop in Europe, in those few areas where Europe has an edge in basic S&T. It seems that there is an increasing S&T protectionism rather than a development of international markets for science and technology that results from differences in the national technology supply structures such as the ones described above. This S&T protectionism among nations and trade blocks could be a temporary phenomenon, but chances are that it will thrive on perceptions of problems with appropriating the benefits of private and public investments in R&D.
4.
Acquisition of Small Technology-Based Firms by Swedish
Larqe Firms
Previous research
Many studies have claimed that small companies have a stage-specif ic or total advantage over their larger counterparts, in regard to innovative activities. williamson (1975, pp. 196-207) divides the innovation process into three stages invention, development and final supply -and argues that no single size or form of organization has optimum properties with respect to all stages. Rather a system in which large firms acquire small ones at some point is optimal, he argues. Small firms are then considered to have comparative advantages at early stages of the innovation process, while large firms have advantages at later stages, for example by providing financial or managerial resourc~s or an already established sales organization for international marketing.
However, there are few if any systematic empirieal studies of how large eompanies aequire small ones with the primary motive of aequiring their teehnology. utterback and Reitberger (1982, p. 23) found that of all Swedish manufaeturing firms with 5-20 employees in 1975, about 10% had been aequired by larger firms by 1980. For a sUb-sample of 60 STBFs formed between 1965 and 1980, the situation in the early 1980s was that 50% of the firms were wholly owned, 72% majority-owned, and 8% minority-owned by their original founders (op.eit. p. 33). 2'0% of the firms were wholly owned by others than the original founders. Of the 17 firms (28%) majority-owned by others, 12 had been taken over by large manufaeturing firms (i.e. firms with more than 1,000 employees). A further analysis of the utterbaek-Reitberger data shows that the average age at the time of aequisition for those 17 firms thathad been aequired by 1982 was 5.8 years, and that the rate of aequisitions made by large firms had been radieally inereasing during 1965-1988 (ef .  Table 4 .1 below).
-9 -A main conclusion from the above-mentioned study is that the importance of large firms in the development of small firms in Sweden has been increasing through take-overs, customer pre-payments, R&D collaboration, and provision of a general breeding ground for new firms. In some of the critical stages of the development process of STBFs, the creation of a symbiotic relationship with a large firm has to be contempiated by the small firm. With respect to financing, an alternative or a complement would be to turn to a stock market or aventure capital market in general. However, the latter alternative might not always provide the necessary extensions of management, marketing, production and R&D capabilities of the small firm. Transactionai cost considerations often make the small firm entrepreneur favor the resource-rich large firm over the various input markets. 
Summary of the case study
This section summarizes a first study of the phenomenon of L TBFs acquiring STBFs as reported by Granstrand and Jacobsson (1983) and further developed by Jacobsson (1984) . The study was exploratory since no previous studies of this type of acquisitions had been found, either in Sweden or abroad. Its empirical part consisted mainly of 5-10 interviews about each of 13 acquisitions. These were chosen from the acquisitions made by four LTBFs, covering the two most R&:D-intensive industrial sectors in Sweden on a 2-digit ISIC level. The 13 acquisitions were also selected as extreme cases with respect to a compound success-failure variable related to the outcome of the acquisition in various technological commercial and economic respects.
In general, the following factors were found to be more or less related to the outcome of a large firm's acquisition of a small, technology-based firm:
a The type and degree of diversification of the acquiring firm j)
The nationality of the acquired firm
The most important of these factors will be commented upon below.
Regarding (a) it was found that when the owners of a small firn'! we re selling mainly because they needed capita! for private consumption, there was a strong tendency towards opportunistic behavior. Since the market for corporate controi in the particular cases of acquisitions considered here was characterized by a high degree of monopolistic power, the seller often had possibilities to withhold or even distort data which were necessary for evaluation of the firm. Thus, the re was an increased risk that the buyer did not know what he was buying, which of course would increase the risk of post-acquisition failure.
Regarding (d) the managers and key personnel in the acquired firm were of crudal importance for a successful outcome, since the managers in the acquiring firm had little or no experience in the technology or the market. To retain key personnel was thus crudal. In all cases where R&D key personnel left within a year af ter the acquisition, and in 60% of the cases where the general manager left the firm, the acquisition led to a failure.
(e) The way in which the small firm should be integrated depended on the type of the acquisition. If the intention of the large firm was to diversify radically, the study indicated that the acquired firm should be organized at the corporate level or in a new venture development unit and left with a large amount of autonomy. If the acquisition was horizontally or vertically related, one usual motive for making the acquisition was to establish synergies in one or more areas. The best way to organize the acquired firm then seemed to be to integrate it in the division with which primary synergies were sought, despite the common risks of NIH (NotInvented-Here) effects and unproductive internai competition.
Synergies we re most of ten found in marketing and R&D. However, when large efforts were made to realize synergies, internai competition sometimes resulted between corresponding functions in the large firm and the small firm. This competition occasionally prevented synergies, but in other cases it stimulated both firms to make progress without cooperation and thus attain greater benefits in total. The mixed verdict regarding the effects of internai competition in general emphasizes the need for adequate attention to the post-acquisition management of acquired STBFs.
(f) Acquisition of an innovative firm not only involves an evaluation of the economic position and market strength of the target firm. It also involves evaluation of a new technology, which is not an easy task. Since the market was of ten characterized by a small-numbers condition in combination with opportunism, the re were strong reasons for the buying firms to spend time in evaluating acquisition candidates. The average time of the acquisition transaction in the sample was 10 months. The failures in the sample all had a transaction time of 6 months or less. This indicates that a longer transaction time is assodated with a successful outcome of the acquisition, although the postponement of a dedsion to acquire may lead to missing a good opportunity.
(g) Of the failures in the sample, 67% were found among the firms that had only an idea developed to a prototype level or had just introduced the first product generation on the market. These firms failed in further developing and marketing their products, and the large firm was never ab le to sell the small firm further. This indicates that the risk of failure is greater if the firm being acquired has not reached a later stage in the business development process.
It is of ten claimed by managers in both small and large firms that the innovativeness in a small firm will disappear af ter the acquisition. Primary da ta has been collected by questionnaires and phone interviews for all three samples, complementing som e available secondary data for the first two samples. In general, reliable data on profitability have not been available for the acquired firms af ter acquisition. Usually the acquired firm does not remain as a comparable profit center in the large firm af ter acquisition, especially not after the integration process that tends to tak e place soon after acquisition of the type studied here.
Moreover, there are no stock market prices for the STBFs that could be One may also ask whether the results presented here are affected by a search-induced bias in that the buying companies deliberately search for
STBFs not necessarily with a past record of high growth but with dear potential for future growth. To answer this question, the growth pattern among STBFs that had received an offer to sell but rejected it was investigated. Among the 14 firms so identified, no significant difference in growth compared to other non-acquired firms was found. Next we analyze growth after the STBFs have been bought. Table 4.3 shows the results. There is a significant (at the 6-8% leven difference between growth rates before and af ter acquisition, with faster growth after the acquisition.
Moreover, Table 4 .3 shows that the standard deviation for the growth indicators increases af ter acquisition. This may be due to the intervening management factor. In some acquisition and integration processes the large firm's management principles were forced onto the STBF in away that caused counter-productive conflicts and was thus a management failure. On the other hand, some more experienced large firms had developed management skills applicable to the integration process and hence had a better chance to contribute to the growth of the STBF by means of its resources. If such differences in post-acquisition managerial skills are present for a given leve l of resource complementarity, the 
A tentative growth model
We have paid special attention to growth factors associated with age, size, technological diversification, ownership and manageriai control. instance Salter and Weinhold, 1979; Singh, 19811-; Addanki, 1986; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987 a, b; and Scherer, 1985 .) Studies of acquisitions and mergers generally focus on larger acquisitions than considered here, on acquisitions with more available data on stock prices, profits, assets and the like, and on acquisitions made with other primary purposes. Still, comparison of results may be useful. For instance Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987 b, p. 212) found no strong support for the common view that acquisitions are efficiency-inducing through their displacement of inefficient managers. In the study reported in this paper, acquired firms we re not especially ill-managed and to retain key managers and supplement them through additions to a management team was of ten crucial to a successful outcome of the acquisition. Moreover , Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987 a, b) found no significant positive effects of acquisitions on the acquired firm's profitability, which was influenced by asset value write-ups resulting from the acquisition, neither did the y find a positive effect on the post-acquisition growth of R&D efforts. This is in contrast to the present study, where positive effects of acquisitions on sales growth as weIl as on innovativeness we re indicated.
However, the particular type of acquisitions considered in this paper is a relatively recent phenomenon and any evidence is weak at best. As the number of such entrepreneurial acquisitions increases and manageriai systems evolve to handle them, it will become easier to accurately assess their outcome and potential value as an innovation and growth-inducing mechanism in an economy, thereby possibly contributing to institutionai evolution (cf. Day 1988) . Certainly, the common belief that the large noninnovative fkm is preying on the small innovative firm to the detriment of its owners and eventually choking its innovativeness is not at all supported by the empirical studies presented here. Instead, the evidence suggests that the large acquiring firm releases a technology exploitation potential for the small firm.
An acquisition and divestment system for trading STBFs
As mentioned in Section 4.1 Williamson (1975, p. 196) proposes a "systems approach" to creating efficient innovation processes in an economy, whereby small firms specialize in early stages of the innovation process for subsequent acquisition by large firms specializing in late stages. We now propose an extended "system" to inc1ude also the mechanism by which LTBFs spin off STBFs for possible acquisitions so that a market for STBFs is created as a supplement to other forms of technology markets.
There are several reasons for believing that the latter mechanism would be efficiency-inducing as well. First of all, since it presents a new degree of manageriai opportunity, it has in principle potential benefits just as a pure acquisition mechanism has. More importantly, large firms operating in many technological areas become increasingly important as sources of new technologies and invention s with a potential for innovation outside their existing product areas. Since large and old firms, with age sometimes more important than size in this context, may have early-stage disadvantages, they could create new "firms" within the firm, thereby decreasing managerial integration and changing ownership and capital structure, possibly to the point of spinning off a fully independent new firm (or it can be kept at armts length for later re-integration). Moreover , in vertically integrated firms, new or almost new technologies could be more efficiently improved as well as economized if a firm is spun off to exploit them on non-captive markets as well. In such cases, there are also possible benefits for the large firm's remaining businesses since the y might not have to cater to captive suppliers or compete with customers.
At present there are few, if any, empirical studies that go beyond anecdotes in examining benefits from such spin-offs. We may add to the anecdotal evidence that the diversified auto manufacturer Volvo was legally started 1915 as a wholly owned subsidiary to the specialized bearing manufacturer SKF and was spun-off in the earl y 1930s. Today (I989) Volvo ranks as the largest spin-off firm in Swedish industrial history, and a close examination of the corresponding business historie s shows that Volvo would probably never have developed so successfully if it had remained a wholly-owned subsidiary of SKF. Eliasson and Granstrand (1982) repor t four cases of Swedish large firms trying to organize, in a semi-autonomous way, venture development units within the firm which could serve as vehicles for both acquisitions and spin-offs. This organizational idea, at least two decades old, has not been extensively applied in Swedish industry and several unsuccessful attempts are known. However, a large firm can organize both acquisitions and spinoffs of small firms in ways which are yet to be experienced.
White awaiting more empirical studies, some speculations and theorizing are worthwhile. Consider a system with technology-based and technologygenerating firms, consisting of a population of large firms that acquire and spin off small firms, and a population of small firms with entries from and exits to the population of large firms in addition to entries and exits to and from the environment. Both acquisitions and spin-offs could be made with varying degrees of ownership and control, and thus we could also regard the system as a collection of large firms with clusters of small firms attached to them in a dynamically changing quasi-integrated manner.
Such a quasi-integrated system might be innovation-inducing, since it has a potential for combining advantages of manageriai and market mechanisms while mitigating many of their disadvantages. This could be argued in a transaction cost framework in line with WiUiamson's proposed "systems approach". It could more specifically be argued on the grounds that technology, through its information nature (Arrow 1974) , gives rise to classic market failures on the one hand. On the other hand, technological information has peculiar features compared with other types of information, e.g. being more possible to codify, through e.g. mathematical and chemical formula, drawings, nomenclature and patent specifications, and thereby more possible to transfer and accumulate. Technological information is also to some ex tent divisible and less subject to Arrow's information paradox (Arrow, 1974 Day and Eliasson 1986, pp. 199 and 372) . Intuitively it seems like ly that there is a (non-trivial) range of initial conditions and model specifications that would produce persistently recurring time -periods (all with lengths exceeding some possibly small but positive number given beforehand) of co-existence with probability one. However, for the time being this must be left as a hypothesis.
Footnotes: l) Of course, military R&D accounts for roughly half of the world's R&D, and the growth pattern of the world's military expenditures and "output" (national or international security?) could in principle explain the possible growth differential between growth in S&T knowledge and economic growth, but this is unlikely (unIess there are some peculiar interactions between the military and civilian R&D and economy). Other possible explanations of the growth differential relate e.g. to the incentives to publish in the non-commercial part of the S&T system (typically universities but also government labs) or to the possibility that knowledge growth rates are high in those fields that have not yet become commercially exploited to any high degree, or that a declining share of produced knowledge could yield positive RoIs (a slow-down of "real" R&D productivity), or that time to exploitation increases in general. In any case, the notion of even a temporary exhaustion of opportunities to invest in new technology seems unrealistic not only to any active engineer but also to the perhaps less romantic entrepreneur.
2) For example in the way Pernovo is attached to the Swedish chemical firm Perstorp.
3) ("You don't sell a member of the family".) Acquiring a firm is almost considered piracy, as when material-maker Kyocera acquired camera-maker Yashica, as a step in a long-range plan for Kyocera's technological diversification rather than a shortrange move for product diversification.
4) Exponential interpolation was performed for the total sample with five classes: 0-5 years, 6-9 year~ 10-17 ~ears, 18-32 years and 33 years or more. F(X)=l-e-~* ~nd 49 non-acquired cQ~Danies af ter 32 years gives 0.49=e-~3 and =0.0223 and ~20bs =4.90, which corresponds to a significance level of 0.093. Thus one may conclude that the distribution is exponentital on the 10% level but not on the 5% level. 
